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For A  New, Improved Cfesare Borgia 
By Reginald Herbold Green
Overall objectives of importance to all advanced 
industrial societies ... reduction of inequalities 
in the distribution of incomes and power, precisely 
to the extent that these inequalities call into 
question the dominant value systems in the developed 
countries and possibly compromising their long-term 
security.
(pp. 405-6)
strenous action should continue to be taken against 
... growth of wages and indirect wage costs in real 
terms ...
(p.418)
The main objective must be to preserve the mechanisms 
of the market economy by cushioning excessively abrupt 
consequences that might give rise to governmental 
measures which jeopardize those mechanisms.
(p.385)
I
Scenarios Then and Now
A few centuries ago the world - as seen from Florence, one of 
its great centers - was falling apart. The Magnificence of 
Lorenzo (the embodiment of imperial outreach, intellectual 
patronage, and bread for the masses - the Lyndon Johnson of 
his day) had turned to tarnished brass. The moral authority 
of the Pope (spiritual certainty of the rightness of material 
gain) had been squandered. Prophets like Savonarola (depending
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on ones taste or prejudice the Paulo Freire or Ivan Ilyich, 
the Robert Mugabe or Pol Pot, the Janani Luwum or Imam 
Khomeni of his day) called out the bitter, despairing masses 
with a heady mixed appeal to principles and passions. Bands 
of mercenaries (the Selous Scouts, the Meo "Secret" Army, 
the Foreign Legion, the UNITA banditti of Italy) roamed the 
land leaving tracks of fire and blood, repression and anarchy.
A cold, brilliant, cynical man - an intellectual advisor to 
states - looked on in agony. Committed to order and stability, 
to the unity of his land, to mastery of the probable and 
management of the unpredictable he sought to save the 
future of his own career, of the people of his nation, of 
the ideals in which he believed. For him the end trans­
formed the means - he was very frank and open in advising 
in what circumstances it was prudent and necessary to lie, 
to betray, to repress, to kill to serve the greater good.
He sought a vehicle for his message - to win a post of 
advisor but even more to shape the future. And so he wrote 
a handbook for the guidance of his chosen leader. True to 
his own principles, he chose a leader with power and 
ruthlessness, the will to win and the determination to beat 
down his foes. Even though he doubted that leader’s 
vision and commitment to the "true goals” and though his 
cold contempt for Cesare Borgia is ill concealed in 
The Prince, Nicola Machiavelli placed his hopes on him as 
the least bad scenario to hand.
And so it would seem it is with OECD's Interfutures team in 
1979. They too face a world in which "the center cannot hold",
the old verities are crumbling, the outlands threaten to 
invade or hold to ransom. They believe in growth, in inter­
dependence, in rational management - above all in preserving 
the OECD way of life and achieving a new Gulden Age of 
Capitalism. They too have doubts as to who their prince 
should be (more cautious than their predecessor they do not 
venture to name one) - both the Trilateralists and the 
Bilderbergers have in practice proved vacillating, feeble 
and paralyzed of will if weighed against the demands of 
this call to action and manifesto for acting.
II
A Capitalist Manifesto
The three quotations do give a feel for the bottom line in 
the Interfutures teams ' structure of values . Perhaps too 
stark a feel, perhaps not. Post-materialist values are 
dealt with in a less than totally unsympathetic manner - 
but apparently because they are believed to lead to less 
pressure for employment and higher incomes. Basic needs 
(once called basic human needs) receives several favourable 
mentions - precisely for the economies which the authors 
(quite probably correctly) believe "cannot make the grade" 
in a competitive capitalist system. Anton Rupert of Rembrandt- 
Carreras-Rothmans, probably the richest and ablest business 
backer of the Afrikaaner Nationalists said of the Basotho 
of Lesotho "If they do not eat we will not sleep" - Interfutures 
would applaud that sentiment.
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This is a serious study - a serious attempt to define the
IIparameters and policies for a last best chance to create 
a new Golden Age of OECD Capitalism with a human face. As 
such it is a coherent, sometimes incisive, usually interesting 
piece of work. It is not 200,000 words long because the 
authors were lazy - it is on the whole a taught document 
whose repetitions are deliberate attempts to emphasize 
not failures to edit.
Change for Continuity
It is also an intelligent study - the reality of change is 
accepted. Interfutures believes the way to survival for the 
OECD members (to all intents and purposes minus Turkey, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal who clearly are not among its advanced 
industrial economies) is to take the initiative "Mastering 
The Probable and Managing The Unpredictable". This means 
accepting a new international economic geography - 15-20% 
of world manufacturing in developing countries other than 
China by 2000 is a target they accept. It means adjusting 
power structures too - the Newly Industrializing Countries 
are to be brought into the OECD club precisely because 
otherwise it will be too small and vulnerable a minority in a 
world in which too many other economies have some substance 
and autonomy. For the same reason, also to reduce inter- 
generational value clashes and to avoid the need to raise 
public spending as a share of output, advanced industrial 




The one central fuzziness is what precisely Interfutures 
means by "market** and "competition1*. The statement (p.375):
nine European, seven United States and four Japanese 
companies together produce almost 65% of world output 
(excluding centrally-planned economies), and the 
Nippon Steel Corporation and the US Steel Corporation 
each produces more steel than all the Third World 
countries put together, which shows the continuing 
importance of competition in the North in the iron 
and steel market.
certainly suggests that market and competition do not mean 
what they meant to Adam Smith. Indeed while the general 
rule for state intervention in market fs is Occam's Razor 
there are a host of exceptions - intriguingly including 
international trade and exchange rates. Similarly while 
TNC's are viewed as effective agents of mutually beneficial 
change and construction of interdependency, the danger 
that they will be too efficient for the socio-political 
systems of the advanced industrial countries is seen as a 
real one. In fact a code is sought - to make transnationals 
safe for the world and the world safe for transnationals.
Interfutures* team most certainly does not view itself as 
writing a tract for reactioneries or a rearguard defense of 
privilege. Again and again it attacks policies - of states 
and pressure groups (whom it heartily detests whether they 
be workers, consumers, minorities or industries) - which it 
sees as blocking change in the quest of preserving a doomed 
status quo. This report, on the contrary, is presented as 
a manifesto for maximum bargained mutual interest solutions
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within advanced industrial economies, among them, between 
them and centrally planned economies, between them and 
developing economies. It is quite serious in its emphasis 
on increased food production by and for the poor and on 
the unsatisfactory pace at which absolute poverty will 
fall even on its more optimistic scenarios. This is a 
humane Eurocentric capitalist call to arms in the tradition 
of British 19th century reformism.
An Uncertain Trumpet?
This particular worldview and set of convictions does seem
y
to lead to certain misreadings. Algeria (pp. 219-220) is 
presented as a pure model of an up and coming NIC firmly 
and single mindedly driving for OECD membership "and the 
devil take the hindmost" at home or abroad. The notes on 
social tensions and agriculture read as if the authors saw 
it as another Iran - the Team evidendly mourns the Shah 's 
regime#but views it as having sinned against the precept 
of not allowing inequalities so gross as to call the system 
into question (pp. 220-221).
More seriously the North-South disengagement scenario 
(pp. 314-321) is rather peculiarly handled. First, it uses 
a quite extreme variant of disengagement and apparantly 
one beginning with a standing start breakdown not a phased 
reduction of North-South parallel to South-South and 
domestic buildup. It is doubtful that Chairman Mao £who 
raised China's External Trade to GDP ratio) or Boriloche
who are cited as the intellectual authors of this schema 
would fully accept parentage. Second, the model is built 
in a way showing that reduction of aid to Africa and South 
Asia would reduce growth of food output more than other 
policy changes (e.g. reduced export crop production, shifts 
in state spending) would raise it - on the face of it a 
most implausible result. No less odd is the view that export 
crop producers are among the poorest in their countries and 
that aid usually benefits the poor disproportionately. Third, 
the report notes that better income distribution results and 
that investment and growth recover by 2000 (in the Third 
World). It would be interesting to know at what point the 
estimated large 1980-90 disruption and 1980-1995 low growth 
losses would be clawed back and what the numbers in absolute 
poverty are for this scenario as compared to others.
Finally, by positing an extreme disengagement alternative 
to incorporation with no scenario based on a hard bargaining/ 
selective link reduction/South-South coordination buildup, 
Interfutures is hardly giving a chance to look at the least 
unlikely alternative to incorporation. As it says, its 
fullblooded North-South breakdown scenario is expensive 
to most, unlikely to arise and unstable if entered upon.
But is it the only alternative to an OECD/TNC/Differentiation 
and Incorporation future?
Ultimately there seems to be a more basic misreading. This 
is a call to arms,to vision, to charisma, to heroic virtue 
by governments and those affected by change. In Capitalism,
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Socialism and Democracy Joseph Schumpeter argued - against 
his own hopes and wishes - that capitalism (and bourgeois 
democracy) were doomed because the capitalist had become 
an inherently and iremedially pedestrian figure without 
either charisma or moral authority. Effectively he 
projected what Interfutures would term death by sclerosis.
The evidence presented about the nature of the present 
crisis - and the recurrent warning that descent into a 
protectionist maelstrom among OECD economies is only too 
plausible a scenario - in Facing The Future would seem to 
confirm Schumpeter's vision. What act of^creative 
destructionf?do the writers envisage to achieve a structural 
change on this front? They do view shock as preventing or 
reversing sclerosis^so the question may not be rhetorical 
but the answer is far from self evident.
Since what is called for overall is close to a revolution 
(not in any strict sense a counter-revolution; the system 
sought would in Lenin's terms be a more advanced stage of 
capitalism, and, therefore, one his analysis would argue 
might well justify proletarian support)f a comment from one 
of Marx' critiques of Hegel may be relevant:
No class of civil society can play this (emancipatory) 
role without arousing a moment of enthusiasm, in itself 
and in the masses, a moment in which it fraternizes and 
merges with society in general, becomes confused with 
it and is perceived and acknowledged as its general 
representative; a moment in which its demands and rights 
are truly the demands and rights of society itself; a 
moment in which it is truly the social head and the social 
heart. Only in the name of the universal rights of 
society can a particular class lay claim to general 
dominion.
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Are the establishment intellectuals of liberal democracy 
such a class today? Are the men of Bilderberg or the 
Trilateralists? If not then the Facing The Future is 
inherently a flawed and uncertain trumpet.
IV
For the Ashcan of History? Not Just Yet
It is quite true that with only a moderate degree of bias 
the slogan for Interfutures * magnum opus could be phrased: 
Privileged of the world, Unite! You have everything to 
loose if you do not reforge the chains! That is presumably 
not a slogan dear to the hearts of most readers of the 
IFDA Dossier. However, that is no reason not to read 
Facing the Future. There are five rather good reasons 
why it should be read:
1. it is the best sustained statement of the neo­
capitalist case available - if that is the enemy it 
is as needful to knew it as if it is the mentor and 
friend;
2. a number of pieces are sure to be used - consciously 
or not - by actors with less clarity, wholism and 
personal decency than the authors - one could crib
a "policy for Pinochet" from the volume but that
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would be both a libel on it and a stupid misreading 
as on their own princip les the team should (presumably 
do) see the Chile of the junta as inherently unstable 
and thus a general danger to capitalism with a human 
face;
3. much of the data, organization and analysis presented as
backdrop (e.g. on population, energy, value changes,
time lags) is of direct use to anyone concerned with 
the trajectary of the 1969-19?? New International 
Economic Disorder;
4. the international trade/structural adjustment and north/
south sections have explorations of options and constraints 
(freedom and necessity) which are in part as critical to
the process of struggle for a N I E O consistent with
the speeches of Presidents Boumedienne and Nyerere as 
with those of Chairman Mao, and with the Charter of the 
Economic Rights and Duties of States as to the process 
of struggle for a mutated New Bretton Woods order;
5. if it were fully implemented, 4t preferred scenarios
A (high growth) or B1 (moderate growth with agreed 
alternative values) would be better than the present
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or the least unlikely scenarios, D(militant protectionism 
plus North-South dominance groupings of the Eurafrica 
type) and B3 (moderate growth with increased intra and 
international cleavages). Better not simply for 
capitalism and for capitalists - better, in all prob­
ability for workers and peasants on the periphery and 
at the centre. This is at least a yardstick against 
which to test alternatives.
V
Differentiation and Incorporation; the End of the Third World
Facing the Future (like Sabri Abdullah in Development Dialogue) 
has it right - the unity and definition of the Third World 
is in contrast and in struggle with the First World (and 
peripherally the Second). Within itself there is hetero- 
genity and differentiation which is increasing. Naive 
Third Worldism has this quite wrong - organizing on the basis 
of the 77 is building a rather unstable coalition along a 
secondary contradiction because it is antagonistic and 
subject to attack.
Equally correct is the diagnosis that withouf changes in 
world economic geography and global economic management 
participation there can be no stable international economic 
system. Nor can anyone except a convinced neo-isolationist 
quarrel with the assertion that there is mutual interest
solutions (of the negotiated not the natural harmony 
variety) and that Group B countries have an obligation to 
take initiatives in identifying and preparing them.
(Evidently Group B UNCTAD delegations did not read Facing 
the Future or rejected it virtually in toto.) Many 
more detailed proposals are equally sound^albeit in respect 
to South-South it is noticable that the source of the funds 
the TNC banks channel to the South is never cited, much less 
is direct South-South channelling of oil surpluses (say a 
the Manila/Havana proposals of Iraq and the earlier more 
modest ones of Algeria and Venezuela) mentioned.
The problem is the general use of the perspective and the 
pieces. The Third World is to be made to disappear but in 
a very specific way which for a majority of the people of 
the Third World might well have some resemblance to the con 
man’s three card trick. The NICs are to be incorporated into 
OECD (hopefully more centrally than Portugal, Spain, Greece 
and Turkey are today and in this study). OPEC is to be 
encouraged to venture in NICery and collegial world 
monetary management. The would be NICs and/or 
significant raw material exporters are to be given access 
to processed goods markets. The very poor are to be 
provided with more aid. (Chifta and(for differot reasons,
India do not fit well so become a fifth and a sixth fragment of the 
Third World.) This is not a divide and rule strategy - 
albeit it would have that result - but a selective, graded 
incorporationist one.
The aid approach is also interesting. More is sought - 
especially in Scenario A - for concentrated use in Africa 
and South Asia to reduce inequalities. For other regions 
better managed, longer term debt and sorting out the 1980's 
repayment hump are prescribed. The question here is partly 
one of cone and partly one of ends. The tone of the basic 
needs and aid to poorest bits is that some silly elites out 
there are "so sharp they'll cut themselves" and must be 
restrained from such madness. As to ends, the regional aid 
venture cited as a model - Club du Sahel - has been radically 
criticized as a vehicle for external planning of the region 
(and for very uncertain and uneven concern with the absolutely 
poor). With it and Lome near as examples of North-South 
collegial management relevant to the very poor countries^a 
certain wary cynicism on the Third World side would appear 
amply justified.
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VI
Facing the New Protectionism
The Interfutures teams' two horror story scenarios are C 
(North-South break) and D (North-North predatary protection­
ism with bits of the South as appendages of the Northern 
triad EEC/Japan/USA albeit why EEC would remain in one piece 
under D is unclear). And one of the counts against C is 
that it would collapse into D. Scenario B-3 (moderate growth 
with growing divergence) is both seen as most likely and 
criticized as in great danger of collapsing into D.
However, Facing the Future does not adopt the Neanderthal 
Free Trade line of the GATT Secretariat. It sees inter­
national trade as requiring a reversal of the new protection­
ism if major losses are not to ensue for all parties.
But it accepts (probably for the wrong reasons) that while 
genuine adjustment to (not false adjustment to block) change 
is vital so too is time to reduce social costs and strains, 
Thus it seeks to encourage exploration of medium term 
coordination, target setting and management (pp383-389) for 
economic geography and trade.
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In two ways this is not "managed free trade". Facing The 
Future is quite serious about seeking trade expansion 
including special measures to increase Third World access 
to First World markets for temparate foodstuffs, processed 
goods, textiles and garments, steel, ships. But, also, it 
is anti bureaucratic. A state role does not alarm it - a 
joint state/TNC body or a state trading body with dynamism 
appear to be on its "good" list. "It must not lead to a 
bureaucratic management of the world economy". (p.401).
One need not be a free trader or a TNC/State symbiotic 
management advocate to back this aspect of the Interfutures 
Report. The new protectionism is a grave danger - especially 
if one supposes that transition to stable, unified values with 
low growth in the centre is almost impossible except from a 
successful initial moderate to high growth position (i.e. 
a failed growth strategy is neither a stable state economy 
nor a hopeful point from which to seek to reach one). In 
particular the escalation of the current trade wars would be 
very crippling (and excluding) for most South economies,
Free trade is better than free discrimination against the
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South (by the multifibre arrangements, the EEC variant of 
"selective safeguards"). Management of economic geography 
change to avert sudden demands for "adjustment" protection 
and coordinate views on probable trade flows would 
also be potentially particularly useful to the periphery.
A number of secondary points (e.g. TNC roles) are disputable. 
But the thrust against protectionism with odd North/South 
geo-political slices and for greater Third World market 
access in the North is broadly in line with the 77*s 
Arusha Framework for Negotiation. For that matter it is 
consistent with the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
as well. There is no reason to assume anyone is muddled - 
it does have a role in several futures.
Own commodities processing is an area in which Interfutures 
and the 77 are basically at one. So is stabilization as to 
substance but not means. The report backs export earnings 
vs commodity price stabilization. As it does not specify 
the financing channel#it is hard to tell whether it derserves
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the criticism that compensatory finance is to a managed 
commodity price as a means tested unemployment relief 
grant (or loan) is to a minimum wage.
VII
Where Now
George Santayana wrote that he who will not know and 
understand history is deemed to repeat it. The authors 
of Facing The Future have certainly made the attempt as 
Minister Rui Baltazar Santos of Mozambique put it in a 
rather different context "to look at our mistakes so we 
do not fall into repeating them." If they seem too attached 
to order - as a basis from which to manage change and master 
events - it is perhaps too easy to criticize. There was a 
demonic side to Savonarola, more damaging he could not 
build. Too many alternative futures do appear to start - 
and end - with the premise "Worse is better" without 
paying adequate heed to what is to be born out of the worse** 
a maimed variant of Trotsky's prescription.
There is, however, a rather more basic failure. This tome 
really is a call to a New Bretton Woods order, a new
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Capitalist Golden Age, in effect a rerun of history with 
a number of warts removed plus better muscular coordination. 
Marx' comment from the "18th Brumaire" suggests a catch 
to that:
Hegel remarks somewhere that all great, world 
historical facts and personages occur, as it were, 
twice. He has forgotten to add: the first time
as tragedy, the second as farce.
Whether Bretton Woods was tragedy may be debateable.
The radicals who now praise the bloc trade systems of the 
1930's as a better model seem a little careless in their 
appropriation of history and their analogy of the Lome 
Convention to Schacht's central European trade system and 
Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is hardly 
self evidently the praise for Lome they suppose it to be!
The attempt to achieve a second coming of a born again 
Bretton Woods, however, almost surely is farce and in danger 
of becoming a gallows humour farce at that. That may be 
unfortunate - the belief in the New International Economic 
Disorder's leading to liberation of the peripheries or the 
triumph of socialism requires a good deal of faith and a 
great deal of nerve.
AThere is one line in Facing The Future which speaks directly 
to this: "not to develop a sort of resignation to the
inevitable but to generate creative responses", (p.424)
There is much in the report to serve as irritant or stimulant, 
solvent or catalyst, thesis or antithesis in such an 
effort. To pursue the quest Chinua Achebe expresses on 
behalf of himself and others:
a deep seated need to alter things within that 
situation, to find for myself a little more 
room than has been allowed me in the world.
